



# OBSERVATIONS 

 ON A PAMPHLET, ENTITLED,THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE
OFTHE

PRESENT DISCONTENTS.
[Price One Shilling. ]

## OBSERVATIONS

on A PAMPHLET, ENTITLED,

## THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE

OFTHE

## PRESENT DISCONTENTS。

B Y

CATHARINE MACAULAY.

Affume a virtue, if you have it not.
Shakespeare?
Thefoukthedition, Corrected.

L O N D O N:
orinted for EDWARD and CHARLES DILI, X
in the Poultry.
M DCC LXX.

## OBSERVATIONS, \&

IT is an undertaking of the highen difficulty as well as delicacy to point. out the corruptions or miftakes of men, whofe difappointed ambition hath led them to offer their fervices to an alarmed and inraged populace, and whofe abilities of character and fituation promife a fuccefsful exertion in the caufe of oppofition. In important parts of duty, every confequence which relates to felf is to be hazarded. On this confideration, notwithftanding the long and malevolent

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levolent perfecution I have endured fromi the interefted part of mankind for a work writteri on the general principles of honeft policy, I will ever in all great points of national welfare, exprefs my gentine opinions to my countrymen; and on this confideration alone I undertake the invidious tafk of making difagreeable obfervations on the baneful tendency of a pamphlet; entitled; "Thoughts " on the Caufe of the prefent Difcori" tents."

To the digrace of human nature, and the plague of fociety, an able head and an honieft heart are but too often feparated. The pamphlet in queftion is written with great cloquence, acutenéfs, and art; bur its fine turined and polifhed periods carry with them a poifon fuficient to deftroy all the little virtue and under-

## [7]

ftanding of found policy which is left in the nation. Whilf the obvious intent of this pernicious work is to expofe the dangerous defigns of a profligate junto of courtiers, fupported by the mere authority of the crown, againft the liberties of the conftitution; it likervife endeavours to miflead the people on the fubject of the more complicated and fpecious, though no lefs dangerous mancuvres of Ariftocratic faction and party, founded on and fupported by the corrupt principle of felf-intereft ; and alfo to guard againt the poffible confequence of an effectual reformation in the vitiated parts of our conftitution and government. A circumftance much to be dreaded from the active exertion of a vigorous and enlightened zeal in the great body of the geople.

The

## $\left[\begin{array}{ll}{[ } & 8\end{array}\right]$

The multitude, whofe judgnents are more efpecially in matters of government, directed by the warm impulfe. of prefent injury, are too apt, in the ficale of comparifon, to regard paft evils with an eye of partial complacency. The offences of a prefent poffeffor of power throw a favourabie fhade over the equally atrocious crimes of his defigning predeceftors. The grievances attending his goyerament, which are but the bitter corfequences, or rather the fruits of feeds fown by his anceftors, are regarded as fpringing immediately from the particular policy of his adminiftration; and thus, the caules of political evils being never traced up to their fources, it is not furprizing that the generality of mankind are 10 unfortunately divided in their opinions concerning their cure.

## [ 9 ]

It is often retorted on feculative reafoners in policy, that not having been engaged in the practical parts of adminiffration, they are apt to rum into refinements incompatible with the grofs and vicious nature of human affairs. Had thefe practical gentemen ever attempted to prove that their fpeculative antagonifs grounded their pofitions on a falfe miftaken notion of a non-exifting virtue in mankind, there would be fome weight in their affertions: but as all fyftematical writers on the fide of freedom, plan their forms and rules of government on the juft grounds of the known corruption and wickednefs of the human character, I flall be apt to fufpect with the vulgar * (when on the authority merely of their experience, without argu-

* Vide Thoughts on the Caufe of the prefent Difcontents, p. 50 .


## [ 10 ]

ment or proof, ftatefmen thwart regulations drawn up on principles of public good, and to counteract particular interent that their opinions are folely formed on finifter views.

The modes of government which have ever been impored on credulous man, have been not only deficient in producing the juft ends of goverif ment, viz. The full and impartial fecurity of the rights of nature; but allo, have been rather formidable and dangerous cabals againft the peace, happincis, and dignity of fociety. This is not owing to any moral impolibility in the forming a fyftem which flould anfwer thefe jut? ends. The wifdom of man is fully adequate to the fubject. It would be unwhing the idea we ought to form of Gon, to fuppofe him fo capricious a being

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being as to betow that high degree of wiflom and ingenuity, which we often fee difplayed, in regulating the more trifing concerns of life, which we often fee difplayed in fupport of tyrannic and deftuctive fyftems ; and not rendering him adequate to regulations fo neceffary to his fecurity, happinefs, and perfection: without which, all the benevolent defigns of Providence in his creation appear to be almoft totally fruftrated.

20 To plan a form of government perfect in its nature, and confequently anfwering all its juft ends, is neither morally impoffible in itfelf, nor beyond the abilities of man, but it is the work of an individual. The generality of mankind are too fond of accuftomed eftablifiments, however pernicious in their naB 2
ture

## [ 12 ]

ture, to adoptmaterial alterations; and this propenfity has ever afforded full ope portunity to the interefed to rejel every part of reformation which tends effectually to eftablim public'good on the ruins of private interent.

In tracing the origin of all governments, we find them cither the produce of lawlef power or acciclent, acted on by corrupt intereft. The fame circumflance which attends the formation of government, attends what is called their reformation ; of this the hiftory of our own country affords a melancholy example, In all the great ftruggles for liberty, true reformation was never by the ruling Eparty either effected or even intencied. *he flaws in the Revolution fyftem left full opportunity for private intereft to excludepublic good, and for a faction, who by their Atrugles againit former tyrannies งリン had

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fad gained the confidence of the people, to create, again the liberties and the virtue of their trufting countrymen, the undermining and irrenfible hydra, court influence, in the room of the more terrifying, yet lefs formidable monfter, prerogative.

A fytem of corruption began at the very period of the Revolution, and growing from its nature with increafing vigor. was the policy of every fucceeding adminiftration. To fhare the plunder of a credulous people, cabals were formed between the reprefentatives and the minifters. Parliament, the great barrier of our much boafted conftitution, while it preferved its forms, annihilated its. fpirit; and, from a controuling power over the executive parts of government, became a mere inftrument of regal adminiftration. It would be invidious and

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even tedious to detail the moral and political evils which the fynem of adminifration that took place at the RevoIution, and which has been regularly, and with ittle alteration fyfematically carried on from that period to the prefent times, hath produced: the deftructive grievance of a debt of one hundred and forty millions, a grievance which operates powerfully and variounty againt public freedom and independence ; a frong mi , litary flanding force, contrary to the very exiftence of real liberty; an army of placemen and penfoners, whofe private intercf is repugnant to the welfare of the public weal ; feptennial parliaments, in yolation of the firmeft principle in the confitution ; and heayy taxes impofed for the advantage and emolument of individuals, a grievance never fubmitted to by any people, not effentially enflaved.

Had

## [ $\mathrm{I}_{5}$ ]

Had any thing befides a mode of tyranny more agreeable to the interefs of the Ariftocratic faltion, which too the lead in the oppoition to the arbitrary adminiftration of king James, been the probable confequence of the Revolution; that important circumfance in the annals of our country had never taken place.

The extenfion of popular powers hath ever been regarded with a jealous eye by a mifinformed and felfifh nobility. To diminift the force of new acquired pivileges, and as a bulwark to the party againt the dreaded vengeance of a routed, though hardly fubdued faction, the power of the reigning prince was to be firengthened by every diabolicalenginc which the fubtle head and corrupt heart of a ftatefman could invent. The nation, inftead of being the paymafters,

## [ 16 ]

Were to become the creditors of go vernment. The larger the national debt, the ftronger was fuppofed to be the operation of this hate engine; the more the people were beggared, the more it diminifred their confitutional in ${ }^{2}$ dependency; and the largenefs of the wevenue, neceflary for the fupply of fo expenfive a government, with the yearly intereft to be paid to its creditors, it was forefeen would afford variety of excufes for levying exorbitant taxes on the public: and thus the management of the revenue would give fo large an additional power to the crown, as to make ample amends for the lofs of a few idle prerogatives

The wicked fyftem of policy fet on foot by the leaders of the Revolutionifts in the reign of king William, and which proceeded

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procceded perhaps more from fear of perfonal fafety than from any very malicious intent againft their country, was thoroughly completed undor the adminifration of their fons. But whilf this flate faction, who called themfelves whigs, but who in reality were as much the deftructive, though conccaled enemies of public liberty, as wore its more gencrous, becaufe more avowed adverfaries the tofies; whill they nere erecting their batteries againft thofe they termed inveterate Jacobites and prejudiced republicans, it never came into their heads, that they were ruining their own importance, and, confequently, rendering the crown ftrong enough to fet all parties at defiance, to put them on their good behaviour, and to treat them with that contempt which is natural to a fovereign in the plenitude of independent power.

## $\left[\begin{array}{ll}18 & ]\end{array}\right.$

A timid prince, in the new eftablifh: ment of fovercignty, will fubject his own interefts and inclinations to the interefts and inclinations of the faction by whofe efforts he was raifed to power, and by whofe infuence he is fupported in it. His ftronger and more confirmed fucceffors will be apt to regard fuch a dependence in no more favourable a light than as a flate of fplendid vaffalage, and be tempted to make ufe of the fuperior advantages of their fituation, to throw off the fetters of former obligations.

That the lofs of their power by his preient majefy's having difplayed the independent greatnefs of his fituation, is the only grievance which a large faction in this country fuppofes to exift among as, and the only grievance they wifl to feenemoved, hath been gonerally furmifed

## [ : 2 ] $]$

by the jealous friends of liberty. That they thould earneftly endeavour to conceal their fentiments from the eye of the public, it was natural to imagine; but that they fhould proclaim it to the world, and endeavour to argue mankind into hazardous exertions of opportion for the ir particular interefts alone, is a confummate piece of indifcretion, which nothing could make us believe practical politicians to be guilty of, had we not been convinced to the contrary by the obvious tendency of the work intitled, "Thoughts on the Caule of the prefent " Difcontents," fuppofed to be written by a man whom we may jufly efteen the mouth of the faction.

In a work, where all the fetters laid unon public liberty are not only regaded with indifference, buttreated as C 2 nece:-

## [ 20 ]

neceffary evils, rather to be fupported than aboliffecl; we cannot help fimiling to hear the author with all the power of cloquence pathetically lamenting, as a man who had remotely felt fomething of the humiliation, the dependent, invidious, and mortiging ftate of that very immediate flave to an abfolute monarch, a minifter of flate: we cannot, I fay, help finiling to hear a philofopher and a poitician lament the natural confequicnce of thofe very eircumflances which he eftecmis neceffary in government.

We camot help wondering at the comuptnes of the heart, and the deception of the licad of the fame writer, who, whit he cnphatically fets forth the -tyman growing from a trut too long
continued-

## [ 2 I ]

continued to parliaments t, yet absfutefy dectaims againf the quick retara of

power

$\dagger$ A vigilant and jealous eye over executory and judicial magiftracy, an anxious care of public money; an opennefs approaching towards facility to public complaint; thefe feeme to be the twie characterifticks of an houre of commons; but an addreffing houfe of commens and a petitioning nation; an houfe of commons full of confidence when the mation is plunged in Elefpair; in the utmof harmony with minifers whom the peopic regard with the utmoft ablorxence; who vote thanks, when the public cald apon them for impeachments; who are eager to grant, when the gerowi voice demands account; who in all difpaites between the people and adminittration prefume againft the people; who punif their diforders, Dut refufe to inquire into the provocations to them: this is an unnatural, a monfrous fate of things in this confitution ; fuch an affembly may be a great, wife, and awful fenate, but it is not to any por pular purpore an houle of commons.

## $[22]$

power in the people's hands, on the very fhallow pretence of horrible diforders attending

This change from an immediate itate of procuration and delegation to a courfe of acting as from original pewer, is the way in which all the popular magiftracies in the world have been perverted from their purpofes: it is indeed their greatef, and fometimes their incurable corruption; for there is a material dititinction between that corruption by which particular points are carricd againft reafon (this is a thing which cannot be prevented by human wifdom, and is of lefs confequence) and the corruption of the principle iffelf; for then the evil is not accidental, but fettled; the diftemper becomes the natural habit.

> For my part, Ithall be apt to conclude the principles of pariament to be totally corrupted, and therefore its ends entirely defeated, when Ifectwo fymptoms; firt, a rale of indiferiminate fupport to all miniters, becaufe this defroys their very end as a controul, and is a general

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tending frequent elections, and the committing cyery three years the independent gentle-
general previous fanction to mifgovernment; and fecondly, the fetting up any claims adverfe to the right of free elcction, for this tends to fubvert the legal authority by which they fit.

They who will not conform their conduct to the public good, and camot fupport it by the prerogative of the crown, have adopted a new plan; they have totally abandoned the fhattered and old fafhioned fortrefs of prerogative, and made a lodgment in the ftrong hold of parliament itfelf. If they have any cvil defigns to which there is no ordinary legal power commenfurate, they bring it into parliament ; in parliament the whole is executed from the beginning to the end; in parliament the power of obtaining their object is abfolute, and the fafety in proceeding perfect; no rules to confine, no after reckoning to terrify: parliament cannot with any great propricty punifh others for things in which they themfelves have been accomplices.

## [ 24 ]

gentiemen of counties into a conteft with the treafury. What was it which fret gave rife to and increated thefe diforders to the prefont fomidable pitch? but the lucrative profped which a feat in parliament, in the prefent mode of corruption, gives for the enriching the reprefentative, at the expence of his country and conflituents. Take away the canfe and the effect will ceafe ; take away from the reprefentative, by a quick and thorough circulating round of rotation, every fuch lucrative and corrupt profpect
accomplices. Thus the controul of parliament mpon the executory power is loft, becaufe parliament is made to partake in every confiderable act of govermment; impeachment, that great guardian of the purity of the conftitution, is in danger of being loft, even to the idea of it.

Thoughts on the Caufe of the prefent Difcontents, p. 35 . et feq.

## [ 25 3

of private interen, and the wam cons tention for feats in parliament, both on the fide of government and individuals, will fink into a coolnefs which will reduce fuct elections to the quiet calmnefs of a nomination for parifl officers. If triennial parliaments will not ferve the turn, change the half; of the whole of your parliment yearly, and deprive your reprefentatives of a comripe and fanding intereft in the legiflature $t$, by debaring every member of parlianent of the capacity of re-election under a certain term of years:
$\ddagger$ The depriving cvery momber of parliametet of a corrupt and ftanding intereft in the lemiflature, by rendering them incapable of ferving anyfinifter views of the court, muft eficetually deftroy the venom of that influence which the auithor of the Caufe of the preient Difcontents feems to think irremediable.

## $\left[\begin{array}{ll}{[ } & 66\end{array}\right]$

We cerainly never ought to be regarda of as a crime, to endeavour by every honet means to advance to fuperiority and power thofe of our own fentiments and opinions. But at a time when our expiring libertics, when the corruption of every falutary principle in the conftitution calls infantly and loudly for a fpecdy and effectual reformation, fhould the contention be reduced to mere endeatours to advance party or friends to fuperiority and power, the people, whofe interefts feem entirely out of the queftion, would act vifely to fuffer the cons tenclers to fight their own battles, without in any fenfe cngaging in the difpute:

Equally averle is the author of the Caufe of the prefont Difcontents againft cvery other conftitutional propofition for semedying the growing evils of our

## [ 27.$]$

government, as againf the orthodox principle of rotation ; a place bill would. fet the executive power at variance with the leginative, and hazard the forms of our excellent conftitution. The forms of a conftitution are fure of little advantage, when its firit is loft. But an independent parliament, the true parliament of the people, is intrufted with fisficient powers to keep the executive parts of the government in a fabordination, which muft prevent any poffible infringement either of the form or the fpirit of the connitution.
17. To corred evils which are allowed to be exceffive, this mighty champion of the whig faction, the author of the Thoughts of the Caufe of the prefent Difcontents, propofes that the people (who are not to be trufted with any additional

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## [ $88 \cdot$ ]

or original powers adequate to the correcting the gricvances arifing from miftaken confidence) thould meet in counties and in corporations to fcan the conduct of their reprefentatives, and to fend, I prefume, dinegarded petitions to the throne for the diflolution of a body of men, whon the vary nature of their trut muft rencler commpt, and whofe fucceriors in offce, fach a truf continuing, mut, from the very conthmuon of human char racters, be cqually treacherous anc. pqually formidable.

A more extended and cqual power of elccion, a very important fiping in the machine of political hberty, is entirely dimegarded by our anthor ; bat tre does not forget to fatter his fovewemp with the hopes, that were his party pace taken into tivour, the purle of the

## [ 29 ]

the people would be as prodigally facrificed to every luft of capricious grandeur and expence, as it is at prefent fuppofed to be, to the venal machinations of fate policy. || Such infamous fattery, could it

I| Suppofe, fays the author of the Prefent Difcontents, we were to aik, whether the king has been richer than his predeceffors in accumulated wealth fince the eftablifhment of the plan of favouritifm, I believe it will be found that the picture of royal indigence which our court has prefented, until this year, has been truly humiliating; nor has it been relieved from this unfeemly diftrefs but by means which have hazarded the affections of the people, and thaken their confidence in partiament. If the public treafures had been exhauifed in magnificence and fplendor, this diftrefs would have been accounted for, and in fome meafore juftified. Nothing would be more unworthy of this nation, than with a mean and mechanical rule to mete out the filendor of the crown. Indecd I hare found

## [ 30 ]

it luave any fen on a wife and jun fovereign, was fitter for the royal ear than for public criticim. The public mut confider moderation as the mont ufeful virtue in a prince, and that a parliament, fulniling its dury, will on no pretence whatoever futer more moneyto be raifed on their confituents than is neceffary for their defence, and the decent magnificence of thein governors.

The difapointments produced by the theachery ofleader, after any hiarp, obfisate, on dangerazis oppofition to governt ment, are verypernicious to the feedom of fociety, by the languor which the want of confidence mint neceflarily intioduce in popular excrions. It is forthis reafon,
found rery fow perfons tifpofed to fo ungeneyeus a procedure.

Thoughts on the Cuufe of the prefent Difcontents, page 3 I:

## $[3 I]$

dat I would warn my conntrymen from entering into any dangerous or even vigorous meafures againft the conduct of their prefent goverinors, without exacting a political creed from leaders, who, undex the fpecious pretenfions of public zeal, are to ail appearances conly plaming fchemes of private emolument and private ambition. I wnuld have them exact fome particular promifes of real public fervice; and be never perfuaded out of this political truth, That as democratical power never can be preferved from anarchy without reprefentation, fo reprefentation never can be kept frec from tyrannical exertions on the rights of the people, without rotation.

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\begin{gathered}
\text { Beryer-Street, Oxfore-Road, } \\
\text { May } 7,1770 .
\end{gathered}
$$

The Two following Articles, written by Mrs. Macaulay.
I. The Hiftory of England, from the Acceffion of James the Firft to the Elevation of the Houfe of Hanover, Four Volumes, Quarto. Price in Boards, Three Pounds; the fame Four Volumes, Octavo. Price in Boards, One Pound One Shilling.
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